Presentations

Abstract

Abstract

Recent work in semantic and syntactic typology reinforces the idea that most of the structure of languages and especially the patterned variation across them is cultural rather than innate. This leaves somewhat unexplained why humans have languages of a kind that other species don’t. The explanation, I’ll argue, is that there is a rich underlying universal infrastructure of communicational abilities that must fundamentally affect the way languages are organized. I’ll review two aspects of this infrastructure: turn-taking and speech act coding and explore how this communication perspective might have substantial consequences for how we think about language structure.

Abstract

This paper begins from the observation that human communication systems are unique in the animal world in varying on every level of form and meaning across social groups. There are some 7000 languages, each differing in sound systems, syntax, word formation and meaning distinctions. New information about the range of diversity and its historical origins has undercut the view that language diversity is tightly constrained by “universal grammar” or a language-specialized faculty or mental module. Instead languages seem rather to be historical accretions of finely honed practices, the product of cultural evolution and diversification over millennia.

Abstract

Ken Hale argued forcefully that linguistic diversity provides a crucial resource for linguistics. If we take this lesson seriously, this diversity provides the opportunity to recast the language sciences in a Darwinian mold — for we are the only species whose communication system differs fundamentally across social groups in both form and meaning. Starting from work by myself and colleagues in Island Melanesia, I argue that the patterns of diversity can be understood almost entirely in terms of cultural evolution over deep time. Language universals — understood as constraints specific to the language capacity — do not seem to strongly constrain these patterns: Absolute universals are almost always confronted by counterevidence, and Greenbergian statistical universals also turn out to be less robust than presumed. The puzzle that then arises is what exactly endows humans and humans alone with the language capacity? I argue that humans share an innate infrastructure for language which is largely pragmatic and ethological in character: the capacity for vocal learning, multimodal signaling, turn-taking, and especially intention-recognition. These capacities allow infants to bootstrap themselves into the local language. I suggest that the future for the language sciences involves embracing the diversity, and exploring how on the one hand one species can support such a diverse range of communication systems, and how conversely, within a speech community, internal variation can be damped down to produce relative uniformity.

Abstract

The language sciences are currently non-Darwinian for a range of historical reasons, but the most important is that theory has been dominated by the paradigm inherited from the birth of the Cognitive Sciences in the 1950s. In that paradigm, language is viewed as largely invariant algebraic system running on an innate symbol manipulation machine, whose origin is (more or less) an evolutionary freak. This paradigm ignores a key property of human language: it is the only known animal communication system that varies in form and meaning across social groups. Meanwhile empirical work on the languages of the world has accumulated to a point where a paradigm change is clearly necessary. The recent work points to linguistic diversity at every level, with family resemblances largely accounted for by common cultural descent. Exceptionless universals of language now seem vanishingly rare. If cultural evolution accounts for language diversity, what accounts for the common core and the universal use of language across the species? I'll argue that humans are endowed with an 'interaction engine', a shared foundation for communicative interaction which bootstraps infants into the local language tradition, and which no doubt has deep phylogenetic roots.

Abstract

Why is it that language is good at describing certain states of affairs (e.g., the kinship relation between me and my grandfather), but very limited in others (e.g., describing smells)? Ineffability – the difficulty or impossibility of putting certain experiences into words – is a topic that has been relatively neglected within the cognitive sciences. But limits on the ability to express sensorial experiences in words can tell us important things about how the mind works, how different modalities do or do not talk to one another, and how language does, or does not, interact with other mental faculties. This talk presents the results of a large-scale cross-linguistic investigation of how different perceptual domains are coded across languages and cultures. Speakers from more than a dozen languages – including three sign-languages – were asked to describe a standardized set of stimuli of color patches, geometric shapes, simple sounds, tactile textures, smells and tastes. The languages are typologically, genetically and geographically diverse, representing a wide-range of cultures. We examine how codable the different sensory modalities are by comparing how consistent speakers are in how they describe the materials in each modality. The results suggest that differential codability may be at least partly the result of cultural preoccupation. This shows that the senses are not just physiological phenomena but are constructed through linguistic, cultural and social practices.