Publications

Abstract

When assessing dangerousness of mentally ill persons with the objective of making a decision on civil commitment, medical and legal experts use information typically belonging to their professional frame of reference. This is investigated in two studies of the commitment decision. It is hypothesized that an ‘expertise bias’ may explain differences between the medical and the legal expert in defining the dangerousness concept (study 1), and in assessing the seriousness of the danger (study 2). Judges define dangerousness more often as harming others, whereas psychiatrists more often include harm to self in the definition. In assessing the seriousness of the danger, experts tend to be more tolerant with regard to false negatives, as the type of behavior is more familiar to them. The theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.

Abstract

Participants performed an artificial grammar learning task, in which the standard finite
state grammar (J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behavior 6 (1967) 855) was extended with a recursive
rule generating self-embedded sequences. We studied the learnability of such a rule in two experiments.
The results verify the general hypothesis that recursivity can be learned in an artificial
grammar learning task. However this learning seems to be rather based on recognising
chunks than on abstract rule induction. First, performance was better for strings with more
than one level of self-embedding in the sequence, uncovering more clearly the self-embedding
pattern. Second, the infinite repeatability of the recursive rule application was not spontaneously
induced from the training, but it was when an additional cue about this possibility was
given. Finally, participants were able to verbalise their knowledge of the fragments making up
the sequences––especially in the crucial front and back positions––, whereas knowledge of the
underlying structure, to the extent it was acquired, was not articulatable. The results are discussed
in relation to previous studies on the implicit learnability of complex and abstract rules.

Abstract

In this paper hypothesis‐testing behaviour is compared to risk‐taking behaviour. It is proposed that choosing a suitable test for a given hypothesis requires making a preposterior analysis of two aspects of such a test: the probability of obtaining supporting evidence and the evidential value of this evidence. This consideration resembles the one a gambler makes when choosing among bets, each having a probability of winning and an amount to be won. A confirmatory testing strategy can be defined within this framework as a strategy directed at maximizing either the probability or the value of a confirming outcome. Previous theories on testing behaviour have focused on the human tendency to maximize the probability of a confirming outcome. In this paper, two experiments are presented in which participants tend to maximize the confirming value of the test outcome. Motivational factors enhance this tendency dependent on the context of the testing situation. Both this result and the framework are discussed in relation to other studies in the field of testing behaviour.