Publications

Abstract

A foundational assumption of human communication is that speakers should say as much as necessary, but no more. Yet, people routinely produce redundant adjectives and their propensity to do so varies cross-linguistically. Here, we propose a computational theory, whereby speakers create referential expressions designed to facilitate listeners’ reference resolution, as they process words in real time. We present a computational model of our account, the Incremental Collaborative Efficiency (ICE) model, which generates referential expressions by considering listeners’ real-time incremental processing and reference identification. We apply the ICE framework to physical reference, showing that listeners construct expressions designed to minimize listeners’ expected visual search effort during online language processing. Our model captures a number of known effects in the literature, including cross-linguistic differences in speakers’ propensity to over-specify. Moreover, the ICE model predicts graded acceptability judgments with quantitative accuracy, systematically outperforming an alternative, brevity-based model. Our findings suggest that physical reference production is best understood as driven by a collaborative goal to help the listener identify the intended referent, rather than by an egocentric effort to minimize utterance length.

Abstract

When people hear words for objects with prototypical colors (e.g., ‘banana’), they look at objects of the same color (e.g., lemon), suggesting a link in comprehension between objects and their prototypical colors. However, that link does not carry over to production: The experimental record also shows that when people speak, they tend to omit prototypical colors, using color adjectives when it is informative (e.g., when referring to clothes, which have no prototypical color). These findings yield an interesting prediction, which we tested here: while prior work shows that people look at yellow objects when hearing ‘banana’, they should look away from bananas when hearing ‘yellow’. The results of an offline sentence-completion task (N = 100) and an online eye-tracking task (N = 41) confirmed that when presented with truncated color descriptions (e.g., ‘Click on the yellow…’), people anticipate clothing items rather than stereotypical fruits. A corpus analysis ruled out the possibility that this association between color and clothing arises from simple context-free co-occurrence statistics. We conclude that comprehenders make linguistic predictions based not only on what they know about the world (e.g., which objects are yellow) but also on what speakers tend to say about the world (i.e., what content would be informative).

Abstract

In the Dot task, children and adults involuntarily compute an avatar’s visual perspective, which has been interpreted by some as automatic Theory of Mind. This interpretation has been challenged by other researchers arguing that the task reveals automatic attentional orienting. Here we tested a new interpretation of previous findings: the seemingly automatic processes revealed by the Dot task result from the high Executive Control demands of this verification paradigm, which taxes short-term memory and imposes perspective-switching costs. We tested this hypothesis in three experiments conducted in India with newly sighted children (Experiment 1; N = 5; all girls), neurotypical children (Experiment 2; ages 5–10; N = 90; 38 girls) and adults (Experiment 3; N = 30; 18 women) in a highly simplified version of the Dot task. No evidence of automatic perspective-taking was observed, although all groups revealed perspective-taking costs. A newly sighted child and the youngest children in our sample also showed an egocentric bias, which disappeared by age 10, confirming that visual perspective taking develops during the school years. We conclude that the standard Dot task imposes such methodological demands on both children and adults that the alleged evidence of automatic processes (either mindreading or domain general) may simply reveal limitations in Executive Control.

Abstract

In referential communication, gaze is often interpreted as a social cue that facilitates comprehension and enables word learning. Here we investigated the degree to which head turning facilitates gaze following. We presented participants with static pictures of a man looking at a target object in a first and third block of trials (pre- and post-intervention), while they saw short videos of the same man turning towards the target in the second block of trials (intervention). In Experiment 1, newly sighted individuals (treated for congenital cataracts; N = 8) benefited from the motion cues, both when comparing their initial performance with static gaze cues to their performance with dynamic head turning, and their performance with static cues before and after the videos. In Experiment 2, neurotypical school children (ages 5–10 years; N = 90) and adults (N = 30) also revealed improved performance with motion cues, although most participants had started to follow the static gaze cues before they saw the videos. Our results confirm that head turning is an effective social cue when interpreting new words, offering new insights for a pathways approach to development.

Abstract

Previous research has pointed at communicative efficiency as a possible constraint on language structure. Here we investigated adjective position in American Sign Language (ASL), a language with relatively flexible word order, to test the incremental efficiency hypothesis, according to which both speakers and signers try to produce efficient referential expressions that are sensitive to the word order of their languages. The results of three experiments using a standard referential communication task confirmed that deaf ASL signers tend to produce absolute adjectives, such as color or material, in prenominal position, while scalar adjectives tend to be produced in prenominal position when expressed as lexical signs, but in postnominal position when expressed as classifiers. Age of ASL exposure also had an effect on referential choice, with early-exposed signers producing more classifiers than late-exposed signers, in some cases. Overall, our results suggest that linguistic, pragmatic and developmental factors affect referential choice in ASL, supporting the hypothesis that communicative efficiency is an important factor in shaping language structure and use.

Abstract

This study explores the connection between language and social cognition by empirically testing different typological analyses of various demonstrative systems. Linguistic typology classifies demonstrative systems as distance-oriented or person-oriented, depending on whether they indicate the location of a referent relative only to the speaker, or to both the speaker and the listener. From the perspective of social cognition, speakers of languages with person-oriented systems must monitor their listener’s spatial location in order to accurately use their demonstratives, while speakers of languages with distance-oriented systems can use demonstratives from their own, egocentric perspective. Resolving an ongoing controversy around the nature of the Spanish demonstrative system, the results of Experiment 1 confirmed that this demonstrative system is person oriented, while the English system is distance oriented. Experiment 2 revealed that not all three-way demonstrative systems are person oriented, with Japanese speakers showing sensitivity to the listener’s spatial location, while Turkish speakers did not show such an effect in their demonstrative choice. In Experiment 3, Catalan-Spanish bilinguals showed sensitivity to listener position in their choice of the Spanish distal form, but not in their choice of the medial form. These results were interpreted as a transfer effect from Catalan, which revealed analogous results to English. Experiment 4 investigated the use of demonstratives to redirect a listener’s attention to the intended referent, which is a universal function of demonstratives that also hinges on social cognition. Japanese and Spanish speakers chose between their proximal and distal demonstratives flexibly, depending on whether the listener was looking closer or further from the referent, whereas Turkish speakers chose their medial form for attention correction. In conclusion, the results of this study support the view that investigating how speakers of different languages jointly use language and social cognition in communication has the potential to unravel the deep connection between these two fundamentally human capacities.

Abstract

We investigated the effect of optionality on the acquisition of new/given markers, with a special focus on grammaticalization as a stage of optional use of the emerging form. To this end, we conducted a narrative-elicitation task with 5-year-old children and adults across four typologically-distinct languages with different new/given markers: English, Hindi, Mandinka and Spanish. Our starting assumption was that the Hindi numeral ‘ek’ (one) is developing into an indefinite article, which should delay children’s acquisition because of its optional use to introduce discourse referents. Supporting the Optionality Hypothesis, Experiment 1 revealed that obligatory markers are acquired earlier than optional markers. Experiment 2 focused on Hindi and showed that 10-year-old children’s use of ‘ek’ to introduce discourse characters was higher than 5-year-olds’ and comparable to adults’, replicating this pattern of results in two different cities in Northern India. Lastly, a follow-up study showed that Mandinka-speaking children and adults made use of all available discourse markers when tested on a familiar story, rather than with pictorial prompts, highlighting the importance of using culturally-appropriate methods of narrative elicitation in cross-linguistic research. We conclude by discussing the implications of article grammaticalization for common ground management in a speech community.

Abstract

While most research on scalar implicature has focused on the lexical scale “some” vs “all,” here we investigated an understudied scale formed by two syntactic constructions: categorizations (e.g., “Wilma is a nurse”) and comparisons (“Wilma is like a nurse”). An experimental study by Rubio-Fernandez et al. (2017) showed high rates of logical responses to superordinate comparisons, even though they are underinformative when interpreted pragmatically (e.g., “A robin is like a bird” implies that a robin is not a bird). Based on recent studies on enrichment priming, we predicted that including “some” and “all” statements (which typically elicit high rates of pragmatic responses) in sentence verification and sentence evaluation tasks would introduce an informativity bias, increasing pragmatic responses to superordinate comparisons. The results of three Web-based experiments supported our predictions, showing that different scalar expressions not only give rise to different rates of scalar implicatures, but can also affect the degree to which an experimental task elicits pragmatic reasoning.

Abstract

Demonstratives—simple referential devices like this and that—are linguistic universals, but their meaning varies cross-linguistically. In languages like English and Italian, demonstratives are thought to encode the referent’s distance from the producer (e.g., that one means “the one far away from me”),
while in others, like Portuguese and Spanish, they encode relative distance from both producer and receiver (e.g., aquel means “the one far away from both of us”). Here we propose that demonstratives are also sensitive to the receiver’s focus of attention, hence requiring a deeper form of social cognition
than previously thought. We provide initial empirical and computational evidence for this idea, suggesting that producers use
demonstratives to redirect the receiver’s attention towards the intended referent, rather than only to indicate its physical distance.

Abstract

This study investigated the extent to which 3- and 4-year-old children may rely on associative memory representations to pass an unexpected-contents false-belief task. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds performed at chance in both a standard Smarties task and a modified version highlighting the secrecy of the contents of the tube. These results were interpreted as evidence that having to infer the answer to a false-belief question (without relying on memory representations) is generally difficult for preschool children. In Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c, 3-year-olds were tested at 3-month intervals during their first year of preschool and showed better performance in a narrative version of the Smarties task (chance level) than in the standard version (below-chance level). These children performed even better in an associative version of the narrative task (above-chance level) where they could form a memory representation associating the protagonist with the expected contents of a box. The results of a true-belief control suggest that some of these children may have relied on their memory of the protagonist’s preference for the original contents of the box (rather than their understanding of what the protagonist was expecting to find inside). This suggests that when 3-year-olds passed the associative unexpected-contents task, some may have been keeping track of the protagonist’s initial preference and not only (or not necessarily) of the protagonist’s false belief. These results are interpreted in the light of current accounts of Theory of Mind development and failed replications of verbal false-belief tasks.

Abstract

The Violation-of-Expectation paradigm is a widespread paradigm in infancy research that relies on looking time as an index of surprise. This methodological review aims to increase the reliability of future VoE studies by proposing to standardize reporting practices in this literature. I review 15 VoE studies on false-belief reasoning, which used a variety of experimental parameters. An analysis of the distribution of p-values across experiments suggests an absence of p-hacking. However, there are potential concerns with the accuracy of their measures of infants’ attention, as well as with the lack of a consensus on the parameters that should be used to set up VoE studies. I propose that (i) future VoE studies ought to report not only looking times (as a measure of attention) but also looking-away times (as an equally important measure of distraction); (ii) VoE studies must offer theoretical justification for the parameters they use, and (iii) when parameters are selected through piloting, pilot data must be reported in order to understand how parameters were selected. Future VoE studies ought to maximize the accuracy of their measures of infants’ attention since the reliability of their results and the validity of their conclusions both depend on the accuracy of their measures.

Abstract

There is an ongoing debate, both in philosophy and psychology, as to whether people are able to automatically infer what others may know, or whether they can only derive belief inferences by deploying cognitive resources. Evidence from laboratory tasks, often involving false beliefs or visual-perspective taking, has suggested that belief inferences are cognitively costly, controlled processes. Here we suggest that in everyday conversation, belief reasoning is pervasive and therefore potentially automatic in some cases. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two pre-registered self-paced reading experiments (N1 = 91, N2 = 89). The results of these experiments showed that participants slowed down when a stranger commented ‘That greasy food is bad for your ulcer’ relative to conditions where a stranger commented on their own ulcer or a friend made either comment – none of which violated participants’ common-ground expectations. We conclude that Theory of Mind models need to account for belief reasoning in conversation as it is at the center of everyday social interaction

Abstract

A pragmatic account of referential communication is developed which presents an alternative to traditional Gricean accounts by focusing on cooperativeness and efficiency, rather than informativity. The results of four language-production experiments support the view that speakers can be cooperative when producing redundant adjectives, doing so more often when color modification could facilitate the listener's search for the referent in the visual display (Experiment 1a). By contrast, when the listener knew which shape was the target, speakers did not produce redundant color adjectives (Experiment 1b). English speakers used redundant color adjectives more often than Spanish speakers, suggesting that speakers are sensitive to the differential efficiency of prenominal and postnominal modification (Experiment 2). Speakers were also cooperative when using redundant size adjectives (Experiment 3). Overall, these results show how discriminability affects a speaker's choice of referential expression above and beyond considerations of informativity, supporting the view that redundant speakers can be cooperative.

Abstract

Gricean pragmatics has often been criticised for being implausible from a psychological point of view. This line of criticism is never backed up by empirical evidence, but more importantly, it ignores the fact that Grice never meant to advance a processing theory, in the first place. Taking our lead from Marr (1982), we distinguish between two levels of explanation: at the W-level, we are concerned with what agents do and why; at the H-level, we ask how agents do whatever it is they do. Whereas pragmatics is pitched at the W-level, processing theories are at the H-level. This is not to say that pragmatics has no implications for psychology at all, but it is to say that its implications are less direct than is often supposed.

Abstract

In standard Relevance Theory, hyperbole and metaphor are categorized together as loose uses of language, on a continuum with approximations, category extensions and other cases of loosening/broadening of meaning. Specifically, it is claimed that there are no interesting differences (in either interpretation or processing) between hyperbolic and metaphorical uses (Sperber & Wilson, 2008). In recent work, we have set out to provide a more fine-grained articulation of the similarities and differences between hyperbolic and metaphorical uses and their relation to literal uses (Carston & Wearing, 2011, 2014). We have defended the view that hyperbolic use involves a shift of magnitude along a dimension which is intrinsic to the encoded meaning of the hyperbole vehicle, while metaphor involves a multi-dimensional qualitative shift away from the encoded meaning of the metaphor vehicle. In this article, we present three experiments designed to test the predictions of this analysis, using a variety of tasks (paraphrase elicitation, self-paced reading and sentence verification). The results of the study support the view that hyperbolic and metaphorical interpretations, despite their commonalities as loose uses of language, are significantly different.