Presentations

Abstract

Abstract

Recent work in semantic and syntactic typology reinforces the idea that most of the structure of languages and especially the patterned variation across them is cultural rather than innate. This leaves somewhat unexplained why humans have languages of a kind that other species don’t. The explanation, I’ll argue, is that there is a rich underlying universal infrastructure of communicational abilities that must fundamentally affect the way languages are organized. I’ll review two aspects of this infrastructure: turn-taking and speech act coding and explore how this communication perspective might have substantial consequences for how we think about language structure.

Abstract

This paper begins from the observation that human communication systems are unique in the animal world in varying on every level of form and meaning across social groups. There are some 7000 languages, each differing in sound systems, syntax, word formation and meaning distinctions. New information about the range of diversity and its historical origins has undercut the view that language diversity is tightly constrained by “universal grammar” or a language-specialized faculty or mental module. Instead languages seem rather to be historical accretions of finely honed practices, the product of cultural evolution and diversification over millennia.

Abstract

This paper approaches the issues surrounding the relationship between language and music tangentially, by arguing that the language sciences have largely misconstrued the nature of their object of study – when language is correctly repositioned as a quite elaborate cultural superstructure resting on two biological columns as it were, the relationship to music looks rather different.

Abstract

This paper addresses the phenomenon of single turns, even single turn-constructional units, that perform multiple speech acts or social actions. The paper reviews the main approaches - ''indirect speech acts'' as treated in linguistic pragmatics, and the ''vehicle'' approach as in conversation analysis - and argues that both of these are inadequate. Instead a solution is sought in the hierarchical nature of action planning, and it is shown that this approach sheds considerable light on multi-action turns. The simplest cases involve pre-sequences, but more complex cases involving extended ''projects'' by participants are also reviewed. It seems that there is no principled limit to the number of actions that a single turn-construcional unit can perform - certainly cases of up to four such actions can be found. The implications for speech act theory and conversation analysis are spelled out.

Abstract

Recursion has become a lamp for the linguistic moths – it has become an obsession far from the centre of what linguistics should be focused on. It plays a limited role in the structure of many languages, indefinite recursion is of course never actually displayed, and what is exemplified could therefore always be modeled in practice by finite state devices. There are many more central puzzles to focus on, like the diverse specific structures mapped on strings, rather than the mechanisms that generate unstructured string-sets. Embedded clauses have been the main focus of interest, but it is noteworthy that (a) many languages offer very limited embedding possibilities; (b) some which do have embedding effectively cap embedding at one deep; (c) almost any such embeddings can be paraphrased by parataxis (strings of adjoined clauses as in veni, vidi, vici). Parataxis is why many languages can lack embedded clauses of different kinds without any loss of expressive power: the expressive power is always present in the pragmatics whether or not it is there in the syntax. To make the point that expressive power lies in the pragmatics, I’ll examine centre-embedding in interactive discourse. Centre-embedding has the virtue that it is easily distinguished from parataxis – which is not the case for edge-recursion in many languages. Centre-embedding in clauses is effectively capped at two deep in all spoken languages (very occasionally three deep in written), apparently by memory and parsing limitations. But centre-embedding in interactive discourse can break this barrier, and does so routinely. The explanation for this is actually unclear, but the phenomenon would seem to show the advantages of distributed cognition. Rather than thinking of recursion as the performance-limited “externalization” of an individual competence, the discourse phenomena suggest that interactive language usage, where centre-embedding is hyper-trophied, is the natural home base and the ultimate source of complex recursion in the grammatical system.

Abstract

Introduction:
Underlying spatial memory and talking about spatial layouts are common cognitive processes (Haun et al. 2005). For example, to locate an object in space it is obligatory to choose a coordinate system called frame of reference in cognition as well as in its verbal expression. Coding space within different frames of reference requires different cognitive processes (e.g. Neggers et al. 2005). In relative frames of reference the origin of the coordinate system is the viewpoint of a person. In intrinsic frames of reference an object is located in relation to another object (Levinson 2003). FMRI data have suggested that different frames of reference show different patterns of neural activation (Burgess et al. 2002; Committeri et al. 2004). However, the number of existing frames of reference and their neural correlates remain controversial. In an event-related fMRI study we investigated whether differential neural networks for relative and intrinsic frames of reference can be isolated.
Methods:
In the present study an implicit sentence picture matching task was used to investigate differential neural correlates for relative and intrinsic frames of reference. Twenty-eight healthy human adults (16 women, 12 men) read a sentence describing a spatial scene followed by a picture, and decided whether the sentence matches the picture or not. Feedback was given either supporting a relative or an intrinsic frame of reference. After half of the trails the feedback switched from one reference frame to the respective other reference frame (Fig.1). Participants were instructed to respond as accurately and as quickly as possible. They responded with their right hand by pressing a key with the index finger for a correct decision and a second key with the middle finger for an incorrect judgment. Two baseline tasks were included (Fig.1): a high level baseline (c5) and a low level baseline (c6).
A 3 Tesla MRI system (Siemens TRIO, Erlangen, Germany) was used to acquire functional images of the whole brain. Using a gradient-echo echo planar scanning sequence 36 axial slices were obtained for each participant (voxel-size 3 x 3 x 3 mm, TR = 2310 ms, field of view = 192, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 75). All functional images were acquired in one run that lasted for 50 minutes. Following the acquisition of functional images a high-resolution anatomical scan (T1-weighted MP-RAGE, 176 slices) was acquired. FMRI data were analyzed using BrainVoyager QX (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands). Random-effects whole brain group analyses were performed. The statistical threshold at the voxel level was set at p < 0.001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons.
Results:
Intrinsic trials as compared to baseline trials revealed increased activity in the parietal lobe and in the parahippocampal gyrus. Relative as compared to baseline trails revealed a widespread network of activity. Increased activity was observed in occipitotemporal cortices, in the parietal lobe, and in frontal areas.
We focused on the direct comparison between relative and intrinsic trials. Results showed increased activity in the left parahippocampal gyrus only for intrinsic trials as compared to relative trails. An ANOVA of the averaged beta-weights with the within factors Reference frame and Condition and the between factor Block order (relative-intrinsic and intrinsic-relative), obtained for all voxels in the parahippocampal gyrus, showed no main effect of Reference frames and Condition. A significant interaction between the factors Reference frame and Condition was observed (p < 0.05). T-contrasts showed a significant effect for intrinsic (c4) as compared to relative trials (c3; p < 0.001).
Conversely, relative as compared to intrinsic trials showed strong increased activity in the left medial frontal gyrus. An ANOVA of the beta-weights in the brain area showed no main effects. A significant interaction between the factors Reference frame and Condition was observed (p < 0.05). T-contrasts showed a significant effect for intrinsic (c4) as compared to relative trials (c3, p < 0.01).
When comparing all intrinsic and relative conditions together to the baseline we observed increased activity in the right and left frontal eye fields (Fig. 2). An ANOVA of the averaged beta-weights with the within factors Reference frame and the between factor Block order obtained for all voxels in the left frontal eye fields showed a main effect of Block order (p < 0.001) and an trend effect of Reference frame (p = 0.08). An ANOVA of the averaged beta-weights for all voxels in the right frontal eye fields showed a main effect of Block order (p < 0.05) only.
Conclusions:
Using a sentence-picture matching task, we investigated whether differential neural correlates for intrinsic and relative frames of reference can be isolated. Intrinsic trials compared to relative trials showed increased activity in the parahippocampal gyrus whereas relative trails compared to intrinsic trials revealed increased neural activity in the frontal and parietal lobe. Both frames of reference together compared to a baseline show increased activity in the frontal eye fields which was stronger for the second block. This could be related to switching of reference frames (Wallentin et al. 2008). The present results confirm studies which report the parietal lobe to be involved in relative coding (Cohen & Andersen 2002). The neural correlates of intrinsic frames of reference were previously less well investigated. The present results show differential neural networks for both frames of reference that are crucial to spatial language.
References:
Burgess, N. (2002), 'The human hippocampus and spatial and episodic memory', Neuron, vol. 36, pp. 625-641.
Cohen, Y. (2002), 'A common reference frame for movement plans in the posterior parietal cortex', Nature Reviews Neuroscience, vol. 3, pp. 553-562.
Committeri, G. (2004), 'Reference frames for spatial cognition: Different brain areas are involved in viewer-, object-, and landmark centered judgments about object location', Cognitive Neuroscience, vol. 16, pp. 1517-1535.
Haun, D. (2005), 'Bias in spatial memory: a categorical endorsement', Acta Psychologia, vol. 118, pp. 149-170.
Levinson, S. (2003), 'Space in language and cognition: Explorations in cognitive diversity', Cambridge: CUP.
Neggers, S. (2005), 'Quantifing the interactions between allo- and egocentric representation of space', Acta Psychologia, vol. 118, pp. 25-45.
Wallentin, M. (2008), 'Frontal eye fields involved in shifting frames of reference within working memory for scenes', Neuropsychologia, vol. 46, pp. 399-408.

Abstract

Action in interaction Since the core matrix for language use is interaction, the main job of language is not to express propositions or abstract meanings, but to deliver actions. For in order to respond in interaction we have to ascribe to the prior turn a primary ‘action’ – variously thought of as an ‘illocution’, ‘speech act’, ‘move’, etc. – to which we then respond. The analysis of interaction also relies heavily on attributing actions to turns, so that, e.g., sequences can be characterized in terms of actions and responses. Yet the process of action ascription remains way understudied. We don’t know much about how it is done, when it is done, nor even what kind of inventory of possible actions might exist, or the degree to which they are culturally variable. The study of action ascription remains perhaps the primary unfulfilled task in the study of language use, and it needs to be tackled from conversationanalytic,psycholinguistic, cross-linguistic and anthropological perspectives. In this talk I try to take stock of what we know, and derive a set of goals for and constraints on an adequate theory. Such a theory is likely to employ, I will suggest, a top-down plus bottom-up account of action perception, and a multi-level notion of action which may resolve some of the puzzles that have repeatedly arisen.

Abstract

Linguistic diversity and the 'interaction engine'. In this lecture I argue that our new insights into linguistic diversity require a rethink about the foundations of language. In the first part of the lecture, I outline why strong theories of language universals now look untenable. Combining typological and phylogenetic data suggests that languages are largely structured by cultural evolution, rather than a specific ‘language instinct’. In the second part, I turn to the implications: What then is the nature of the human endowment for language? I argue that there is a substantial infrastructure for language, which is distinct from language itself, and strongly universal, the ‘interaction engine’ of the title. The infrastructure involves speech capacities of course (vocal learning, vocal apparatus), intention-recognition systems (the pragmatics of Gricean meaningnn), and ethological properties of communicative interaction (turn-taking, structured interaction sequences, multimodal signals, etc.). A working hypothesis is that this base, together with general (non-language-specialized) properties of human cognition, provides enough foundation for infants to bootstrap into their local cultural linguistic tradition.

Abstract

The language sciences are about to undergo dramatic changes. The cognitive sciences have taken their object of enquiry to be the characterization of The Human Mind, and the language sciences have focused on the characterization of The Language Instinct, or Universal Grammar. This abstraction away from variation and diversity is now significantly inhibiting research – after all, diversity at all levels is a unique feature of our communication system compared to all other species. Further, the universals which have been the goal of linguistic research have evaporated in the face of increasing information about linguistic diversity and language change. The alternative Darwinian paradigm embraces the new facts about cognitive and linguistic diversity, viewing variation as the fuel for evolution, and adopts a diachronic perspective in which we can ask about the relative roles of biological and cultural evolution and their interaction. New findings suggest that language diversity is largely a product of cultural evolution under the constraints of general cognitive capacities rather than being tightly constrained by either Universal Grammar or Greenbergian universals.

Abstract

How are the senses structured by the languages we speak, the cultures we inhabit? To what extent is the encoding of perceptual experiences in languages a matter of how the mind/brain is “wired-up” and to what extent is it a question of local cultural preoccupation? The “Language of Perception” project tests the hypothesis that some perceptual domains may be more “ineffable” – i.e. difficult or impossible to put into words – than others. While cognitive scientists have assumed that proximate senses (olfaction, taste, touch) are more ineffable than distal senses (vision, hearing), anthropologists have illustrated the exquisite variation and elaboration the senses achieve in different cultural milieus. The project is designed to test whether the proximate senses are universally ineffable – suggesting an architectural constraint on cognition – or whether they are just accidentally so in Indo-European languages, so expanding the role of cultural interests and preoccupations. To address this question, a standardized set of stimuli of color patches, geometric shapes, simple sounds, tactile textures, smells and tastes have been used to elicit descriptions from speakers of more than twenty languages—including three sign languages. The languages are typologically, genetically and geographically diverse, representing a wide-range of cultures. The communities sampled vary in subsistence modes (hunter-gatherer to industrial), ecological zones (rainforest jungle to desert), dwelling types (rural and urban), and various other parameters. We examine how codable the different sensory modalities are by comparing how consistent speakers are in how they describe the materials in each modality. Our current analyses suggest that taste may, in fact, be the most codable sensorial domain across languages, followed closely by visual phenomena, such as colour and shape. Olfaction appears to be the least codable across cultures. Nevertheless, we have identified exquisite elaboration in the olfactory domains in some cultural settings, contrary to some contemporary predictions within the cognitive sciences. These results suggest that differential codability may be at least partly the result of cultural preoccupation. This shows that the senses are not just physiological phenomena but are constructed through linguistic, cultural and social practices.

Abstract

How are the senses structured by the languages we speak, the cultures we inhabit? To what extent is the encoding of perceptual experiences in languages a matter of how the mind/brain is ―wired-up‖ and to what extent is it a question of local cultural preoccupation? The ―Language of Perception‖ project tests the hypothesis that some perceptual domains may be more ―ineffable‖ – i.e. difficult or impossible to put into words – than others. While cognitive scientists have assumed that proximate senses (olfaction, taste, touch) are more ineffable than distal senses (vision, hearing), anthropologists have illustrated the exquisite variation and elaboration the senses achieve in different cultural milieus. The project is designed to test whether the proximate senses are universally ineffable – suggesting an architectural constraint on cognition – or whether they are just accidentally so in Indo-European languages, so expanding the role of cultural interests and preoccupations. To address this question, a standardized set of stimuli of color patches, geometric shapes, simple sounds, tactile textures, smells and tastes have been used to elicit descriptions from speakers of more than twenty languages—including three sign languages. The languages are typologically, genetically and geographically diverse, representing a wide-range of cultures. The communities sampled vary in subsistence modes (hunter-gatherer to industrial), ecological zones (rainforest jungle to desert), dwelling types (rural and urban), and various other parameters. We examine how codable the different sensory modalities are by comparing how consistent speakers are in how they describe the materials in each modality. Our current analyses suggest that taste may, in fact, be the most codable sensorial domain across languages. Moreover, we have identified exquisite elaboration in the olfactory domains in some cultural settings, contrary to some contemporary predictions within the cognitive sciences. These results suggest that differential codability may be at least partly the result of cultural preoccupation. This shows that the senses are not just physiological phenomena but are constructed through linguistic, cultural and social practices.

Abstract

Ken Hale argued forcefully that linguistic diversity provides a crucial resource for linguistics. If we take this lesson seriously, this diversity provides the opportunity to recast the language sciences in a Darwinian mold — for we are the only species whose communication system differs fundamentally across social groups in both form and meaning. Starting from work by myself and colleagues in Island Melanesia, I argue that the patterns of diversity can be understood almost entirely in terms of cultural evolution over deep time. Language universals — understood as constraints specific to the language capacity — do not seem to strongly constrain these patterns: Absolute universals are almost always confronted by counterevidence, and Greenbergian statistical universals also turn out to be less robust than presumed. The puzzle that then arises is what exactly endows humans and humans alone with the language capacity? I argue that humans share an innate infrastructure for language which is largely pragmatic and ethological in character: the capacity for vocal learning, multimodal signaling, turn-taking, and especially intention-recognition. These capacities allow infants to bootstrap themselves into the local language. I suggest that the future for the language sciences involves embracing the diversity, and exploring how on the one hand one species can support such a diverse range of communication systems, and how conversely, within a speech community, internal variation can be damped down to produce relative uniformity.

Abstract

The language sciences are currently non-Darwinian for a range of historical reasons, but the most important is that theory has been dominated by the paradigm inherited from the birth of the Cognitive Sciences in the 1950s. In that paradigm, language is viewed as largely invariant algebraic system running on an innate symbol manipulation machine, whose origin is (more or less) an evolutionary freak. This paradigm ignores a key property of human language: it is the only known animal communication system that varies in form and meaning across social groups. Meanwhile empirical work on the languages of the world has accumulated to a point where a paradigm change is clearly necessary. The recent work points to linguistic diversity at every level, with family resemblances largely accounted for by common cultural descent. Exceptionless universals of language now seem vanishingly rare. If cultural evolution accounts for language diversity, what accounts for the common core and the universal use of language across the species? I'll argue that humans are endowed with an 'interaction engine', a shared foundation for communicative interaction which bootstraps infants into the local language tradition, and which no doubt has deep phylogenetic roots.

Abstract

Why is it that language is good at describing certain states of affairs (e.g., the kinship relation between me and my grandfather), but very limited in others (e.g., describing smells)? Ineffability – the difficulty or impossibility of putting certain experiences into words – is a topic that has been relatively neglected within the cognitive sciences. But limits on the ability to express sensorial experiences in words can tell us important things about how the mind works, how different modalities do or do not talk to one another, and how language does, or does not, interact with other mental faculties. This talk presents the results of a large-scale cross-linguistic investigation of how different perceptual domains are coded across languages and cultures. Speakers from more than a dozen languages – including three sign-languages – were asked to describe a standardized set of stimuli of color patches, geometric shapes, simple sounds, tactile textures, smells and tastes. The languages are typologically, genetically and geographically diverse, representing a wide-range of cultures. We examine how codable the different sensory modalities are by comparing how consistent speakers are in how they describe the materials in each modality. The results suggest that differential codability may be at least partly the result of cultural preoccupation. This shows that the senses are not just physiological phenomena but are constructed through linguistic, cultural and social practices.

Abstract

Human languages differ in which spatial frame they habitually use. We survey these differences and present a study investigating whether this linguistic difference influences spatial cognition. We compared humans whose languages differ in their spatial relational frames with apes - Pongo, Gorilla, and Pan - on a nonlinguistic spatial task. The same spatial frame was used by all three great ape genera, as well as 4-year-olds in both languages. Older children and adults diverged, using the frame consistent with their language. This suggests that young humans share with apes an inherited primate basis for spatial frames, but that this preference can be overridden by language and culture in humans.